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Abstract. Recently Cherchye et al. (2007a) provided a nonparametric charac-
terization of a general collective model for household consumption which includes
externalities and public consumption. This characterization involved different nec-
essary and sufficient conditions. We identify a special case of the household model
for which their sufficiency conditions are also necessary. We show that verification
of this sufficiency condition is NP Complete which provides justification for the
parametric techniques used in the empirical literature.
1. Introduction
The collective household model introduced by Chiappori (1988,1992) was the first
notable divergence from the unitary approach, which assumes that each household
has a single utility function, that is, it acts as a single decision maker. The household
model differs from the unitary model in the fact that it allows for (possibly diverg-
ing) individual preferences amongst different members of the household. It merely
assumes that the household behaves Pareto optimally, with the weight of each mem-
ber’s utility function providing a measure of their bargaining power. This model has
been widely utilized and tested in the empirical literature. 1
Browning and Chiappori (1998) provided a parametric characterization of the general
collective model. Their model assumes that the aggregate consumption of the house-
hold is observed along with the prices of the commodities. Furthermore, they assume
that the empirical economist cannot observe which goods are publicly or privately
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consumed and that individual consumptions are not observed. They also allow for
externalities as well as altruism.
Recently, Cherchye et al. (2007a) provided a nonparametric characterization of the
general collective model. They provide separate necessary and sufficient conditions
for the observed household data to be consistent with two decision makers and then
generalize these conditions to K decision makers in a supplement to the above paper
(Cherchye et al. (2007b)). Finally they provide simple algorithms for testing both the
necessary and sufficient conditions. These algorithms are exponential in the number
of observed data points although the authors provide ways to potentially improve ef-
ficiency of these algorithms in their paper, as well as in a companion paper (Cherchye
et al. (2005)).
This paper identifies an important special case of the household model for which the
sufficiency conditions in Cherchye et al. (2007a) are also necessary. This is a straight-
forward generalization of the situation dependent dictatorship model in their paper,
but it provides richer interpretations of data that satisfy their sufficiency conditions.
It allows for a small number of unobserved changes in bargaining power of household
members without requiring that each observation corresponds to a particular dictator.
The main result of the paper is that testing the nonparametric sufficiency condi-
tions is a computationally difficult problem. In other words, we show that testing the
sufficiency conditions is NP Complete: there is no known polynomial (in the num-
ber of data points) time algorithm which can verify whether an arbitrary set of data
points satisfies the sufficiency conditions.
Although the main result is negative, it provides a justification for the existing prac-
tice of using a parametric framework in the empirical literature. Moreover it motivates
the bridging of the gap between known necessary and sufficient conditions for consis-
tency with the general collective household model. A more general sufficient condition
would perhaps be easier to test.
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2. The Model
We consider a K person household. An observed data set is a finite set of price -
household consumption vectors D = {(pi, xi)}Ni=1, where (pi, xi) ∈ Rl++ × (Rl+\{0})
and 1 ≤ N < ∞. All goods can be consumed privately, publicly or both. Thus an
arbitrary consumption bundle x can be decomposed as
x =
K∑
k=1
xk + xh
where xk is the (unobserved) private consumption of household member k and xh
is the (unobserved) public consumption of the household.
We consider general preferences such as those in Browning and Chiappori (1998)
that depend not only on private and public consumption but also on other household
members’ private quantities. This allows for altruism and externalities. We restrict
the case to positive externalities as in Cherchye et al. (2007a). This implies each
household member k has a utility function Uk(x1, . . . , xK , xh) which is nondecreasing
in all its arguments. We also assume Uk is locally non-satiated.
For each aggregate observation (pi, xi) we define feasible personalized quantities xˆi
as
xˆi = (x
1
i , . . . , x
K
i , x
h
i ) ∈ R(K+1)l, with xi =
K∑
k=1
xki + x
h
i
This decomposition captures feasible individual and public consumptions from the
given observed data. Given this we can now define the condition for collective ratio-
nalization of data D.
Definition 1 (Collective Rationalization). Let D = {(pi, xi)}Ni=1 be an observed
household consumption data set. Utility functions U1, U2, . . . , UK provide a collec-
tive rationalization of D if for each observation i there exist feasible individual and
public consumptions xˆi = (x
1
i , . . . , x
K
i , x
h
i ) and Pareto weights (µ
1
i , . . . , µ
K
i ) ∈ RK+ such
that
K∑
k=1
µkiU
k(xˆi) ≥
K∑
k=1
µkiU
k(zˆ)
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for all zˆ = (z1, . . . , zK , zh) ∈ R(K+1)l+ with p′i(z1+ · · ·+zK+zh) ≤ p′ixi and
∑K
k=1 µ
k
i =
1.
We now define a special case of the above model
Definition 2 (Consistency with K Decision Makers). Let D = {(pi, xi)}Ni=1 be an
observed household consumption data set. We say the data D is consistent with K
decision makers if there exist utility functions U1, U2, . . . , UK and feasible individual
and public consumptions xˆi = (x
1
i , . . . , x
K
i , x
h
i ) and Pareto weights (µ
1
i , . . . , µ
K
i ) ∈
M ⊂ RK+ such that |M | ≤ K and
K∑
k=1
µkiU
k(xˆi) ≥
K∑
k=1
µkiU
k(zˆ)
for all zˆ = (z1, . . . , zK , zh) ∈ R(K+1)l+ with p′i(z1+ · · ·+zK+zh) ≤ p′ixi and
∑K
k=1 µ
k
i =
1.
This special case only allows situations where the bargaining power between house-
hold members doesn’t change more times than the number of decision makers. This
is clearly still a generalization of the unitary model as the data can potentially be
rationalized by a single household utility function.
This special case includes the situation dependent dictatorship model in Cherchye
et al. (2007a) (in fact, it is easy to show that they are the same (Theorem 1)). As
an example, consider supermarket purchase data of a two person household, where
the identity of the household member who went shopping at each observation is un-
observed. Thus the person whose turn it is to do the chores gets to act as a dictator
and make decisions on the behalf of the entire household.
This special case also takes into account situations where there are a small num-
ber of exogenous unobserved shocks, which result in a change of bargaining power.
Consider a household consisting of a happily married couple. The wife and husband
have an understanding and hence consume according to a some fixed bargaining pa-
rameters 1 − µ and µ respectively. The only strife in the household occurs when
the wife’s mother pays a visit. Then in exchange for being sociable, the husband
has more bargaining power µ′ > µ (the wife’s bargaining power becoming 1 − µ′),
hence consuming more of the goods that he prefers. An example of a model in the
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empirical literature which considers such a one time change in bargaining power is
Oreffice (2005).
Finally we define the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) which will
be used in the statements and proofs of our results.
Definition 3 (GARP). Given arbitrary data set D = {(pi, xi)}Ni=1. For any two
consumption bundles x1 and x2 we say x1 R0 x2 if p′1x1 ≥ p′1x2. We say x1 P
x2 if p
′
1x1 > p
′
1x2. Finally we say x1 R x2 if for some sequence of observations
(xi, xj, . . . , xm) we have x1 R0 xi, xi R0 xj, . . . , xm R0 x2. In other words
relation R is the transitive closure of R0. The data D satisfies GARP if
xi R xj =⇒ xj P xi ∀xi, xj
3. Results
We now show that the sufficiency conditions of Cherchye et al. (2007a) are also
necessary for a data set D to be consistent with K decision makers.
Theorem 1. The data set D = {(pi, xi)}Ni=1 is consistent with K ≤ N decision
makers if, and only if, we can partition the set D into disjoint sets D1, D2, . . . , DK
such that each Dk (1 ≤ k ≤ K) satisfies GARP.
Proof. The proof is immediate from Definition 2. Since the situation dependent dic-
tatorship model is consistent with K decision makers the sufficiency is immediately
established from Proposition S4 in Cherchye et al. (2007b). The necessity follows
from the following. The data points corresponding to particular fixed bargaining
parameters will satisfy GARP, as each household member’s utility functions is non
decreasing and locally non-satiated. Since we restrict the number of distinct bargain-
ing parameters to be less than K the necessity is obvious. 
Our main result establishes the impracticality of using nonparametric tests for
consistency of observed data with the household model.
Theorem 2. Given a fixed integer 1 < K ≤ N . Testing the consistency of the data
D = {(pi, xi)}Ni=1 with K decision makers is NP Complete.
Proof. We will use the partition into forests problem to show the result. This is a
known NP Complete problem (Garey and Johnson (1979)). We will proceed by map-
ping every instance of the partition into forests problem to a particular instance of
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the data consistency problem.
Consider a directed graph G(V,E) and a given fixed positive integer K ≤ |V |, where
V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges. We say there is a directed edge from
vertex i to j if (i, j) ∈ E. Finally we define the out degree of a vertex i as the number
of outward edges from the vertex i. The partition into forests problem is then defined
as follows.
Given an arbitrary integer K, can the nodes of the graph be partitioned into s ≤ K
disjoint sets V1, V2, . . . , Vs in such a way that for each Vj (1 ≤ j ≤ s) the subgraph
Gj(Vj, Ej) induced by Vj contains no cycles; that is, the set of subgraphs Gj is a
forest (set of trees)?
We start with an arbitrary directed graph G(V,E) where |V | = N . We now con-
struct an appropriate data set {(pi, xi)}Ni=1 (in polynomial time) such that the graph
induced by the relation P on the data is the same as G. We proceed as follows.
Let us assume that the number of goods in each bundle is N2. Each good is la-
beled by two numbers mn where 1 ≤ m,n ≤ N . In a slight abuse of notation, we
represent the mnth good in the ith observation by xmni , and the price of the mn
th good
in the ith observation by pmni , where 1 ≤ i,m, n ≤ N .
We now construct the data set D = {(pi, xi)}Ni=1, where price consumption bundle i
corresponds to vertex i ∈ V , as follows
(1)
piii = 1 x
ii
i = 1
piji = 1 x
ij
i = 1 if j 6= i and (i, j) ∈ E
pjii = 0 x
ji
i = 0 if j 6= i and (j, i) ∈ E
piji = 1 x
ij
i = 0 if j 6= i and (i, j) /∈ E
pjii = 0 x
ji
i = out degree of (j) + 2 if j 6= i and (j, i) /∈ E
pkli = 0 x
kl
i = 0 if k, l 6= i
Clearly this data set can be constructed in polynomial time. The intuition behind
the construction is as follows. Each observation i corresponds to a vertex. Each
good corresponds to an edge of the graph, except goods of the form ii which ensure
each observation reflects positive wealth. For any two observations i and j we select
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appropriate prices and consumption bundles for the goods ij and ji (the remaining
goods not coming into play) so that the relation P reflects whether there is an edge
(i, j) or (j, i) in the graph G.
We now check to see if the graph induced by the relation P on the above data
set is the same as G. For an arbitrary i 6= j and i, j ∈ V , if we have (i, j) ∈ E then
p′ixi = out degree of (i) + 1 [which is at least 1]
p′ixj = 0
=⇒ p′ixi > p′ixj
=⇒ xi P xj
Similarly if we have (i, j) /∈ E then
p′ixi = out degree of (i) + 1
p′ixj = out degree of (i) + 2
=⇒ p′ixi < p′ixj
=⇒ xi P xj
In the data set defined above, we have xi P xj (equivalently xi R0 xj) if, and only
if there is an edge from vertex i to vertex j in G (or (i, j) ∈ E). Hence the graph
induced by the relation P on the above data set is the same as G. Moreover, any
subset D′ ⊆ D of the data set satisfies GARP if, and only if, the subgraph induced
by the vertices corresponding to the data points in D′ is acyclic. Hence, we can
solve the partition into forests problem for arbitrary graph G and fixed integer K,
if, and only if, we can check the consistency of the data set D with K decision makers.
The proof is not complete because our model does not allow data with zero prices
or bundles where nothing is consumed. To solve this problem we can replace every
instance of 0 by a very small  < 1 in equation (1). We can once again verify the
inequalities for each i. If i 6= j, i, j ∈ V and (i, j) ∈ E
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p′ixi > out degree of(i) + 1
p′ixj < N
2(N + 2) [Because each vertex can have out degree at most N ]
If (i, j) /∈ E
p′ixi < out degree of(i) + 1 +N
2(N + 2)
p′ixj > out degree of(i) + 2
For small enough  < 1
N2(N+2)
we will have p′ixi > p
′
ixj when (i, j) ∈ E and p′ixi < p′ixj
when (i, j) /∈ E.
Hence, we can map (in polynomial time) any arbitrary graph G to a particular data
set D such that for a fixed integer K we can solve the partition into forests problem
for G if, and only if, the data set D is consistent withK decision makers. Thus testing
an arbitrary data set for consistency with K decision makers is NP Complete. 
4. Conclusions
The computational efficiency of tests are vital to the empirical economist. The
nonparametric tests for consistency of data with the household model are clearly go-
ing to be difficult for the empiricist to implement. Hence, parametric tests using a
particular functional form might be more informative.
However, there is scope to improve the nonparametric tests. A single, testable, nec-
essary and sufficient condition for the consistency of data with the general household
model, would allow us to test for a larger range of possibilities and could prove to be
more computationally efficient. Another approach could be to sample (if necessary
resample) a fixed number of points (a function of the number of decision makers K,
we are testing for) each time and test this subset of the data for consistency. This
will allow a compromise between the accuracy of the test and the computation time.
Such approximate nonparametric tests could potentially be more informative than
the existing parametric tests.
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